This paper extends the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) matching model with endogenous job destruction by introducing post-match labor turnover costs (PMLTC). We consider training and separation costs which create heterogeneity among workers. In particular, there are two types of employed workers: (i ) new entrants who need training in order to become fully productive, and (ii ) incumbents * We are most thankful to the extremely valuable comments received from two anonymous referees. 1 who are fully productive and whose departure from the firm imposes costs on it.
Introduction
The existence of labor market frictions in macroeconomic fluctuations has been increasingly recognized. In recent years, the Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides' (1985) (henceforth DMP) matching model has become a widely used theory of equilibrium unemployment. However, recent studies by Costain and Reiter (2008) , Hall (2005) and In this instance, job destruction is more volatile and plays a bigger role in the cyclical employment adjustment. This dampens the response of job creation to shocks and thereby the correlation of vacancies and unemployment.
Several authors have considered the effect of PMLTC on the labor market. For example, within the search and matching literature, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Wasmer (1999) , Blanchard and Landier (2002) , and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) , among others, have distinguished between insiders and new entrants when these types of costs exist. Our analysis follows the spirit of these papers but differs in scope. We focus on business cycle fluctuations whereas the previous literature has generally taken a long-run perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present evidence on labor turnover costs. Section 3 incorporates training and separation costs in the standard DMP model. Section 4 presents the calibration of our extended model. In Section 5, we simulate the model to check whether it can match some of the basic labor market facts for the U.S.
economy. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.
Evidence on labor turnover costs
Turnover of productive workers is a major source of productivity and profit losses in the U.S. For instance, according to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, during 2003 the monthly average separations relative to total employment in the private sector was 3.4 percent. This means that around four out of ten employees in this sector left their company in 2003. This high rate is almost equal to the rate of hired workers.
Estimates of the costs of employee turnover vary widely and depend on whether all costs are recognized, fluctuating between 25 percent and 200 percent of annual compensation for a leaving employee.
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In general, these costs can be classified into two categories: (i ) Pre-match labor turnover costs, which are those costs incurred by the firm during the hiring process of a new worker, and (ii ) post-match labor turnover costs, which take place after the worker and the employer have matched and started an employment relationship.
To examine the relevance of the hiring process, we can use information reported by Dolfin (2006) and Barron, Berger and Black (1997) in the 1982 Employer Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP), a cross-sectional firm-level survey that contains detailed information on these pre-match labor turnover costs in the U.S. According to the authors, it takes on average 17.2 days to fill a vacancy.
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During this time the number of manhours spent by company personnel recruiting, screening, and interviewing applicants to hire one individual for the vacant position is equal to 13.5.
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Table 1 presents our approximation to the total average cost that comes from these hours, which represents 3.6 percent of the quarterly wage of a fully productive worker, or 4.3 percent of the quarterly wage of a new hired worker. The DMP matching model assumes that once the matching process has finished, the new employee or entrant starts her job with a labor productivity equal to that observed by an incumbent employee working in the firm. In other words, the entrant becomes fully productive immediately. However, data sets have identified the existence of both explicit and implicit costs of training by inquiring about the incidence and duration of various on-the-job training activities, and by identifying the presence of time devoted to learning by doing. All this information suggests that newly hired workers do not become fully productive instantaneously, so there are important PMLTC in the labor market. Along this line, the EOPP survey also considers in a comprehensive way the magnitude of the training costs to the firm.
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According to Barron, Berger and Black (1997) , this survey reveals that about 95 percent of the newly hired workers receive some kind of on-the-job training, spending, on average, 142 hours on this activity during the first three months of work, approximately 30 percent of their working time during that period (see Table   1 ).
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Moreover, other workers spend 87.5 hours on average training a new employee. The total average cost of these man-hours of training is about $1,360 per newly hired worker in 1982 dollars, which is approximately equivalent to 55 percent of her quarterly wage.
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Using the same EOPP survey, Bishop (1996) shows that simultaneously to the training process, the reported average productivity of a new hired employee increases significantly by roughly a third during the first quarter and by an additional 32 percent between the second quarter and the end of the second year of job tenure in the firm. In other words, assuming that the productivity of a newly hired worker reaches the average productivity of an incumbent employee in a period no longer than two years, we observe a starting productivity gap between these two types of workers equivalent to about 40 percent of the incumbent's productivity. This gap is closed after a period of both on-the-job training and learning by doing. Clearly, this information reveals that the turnover of fully productive workers is a major source of productivity losses in the U.S.
The training process is not the only source of PMLTC in the U.S. Using the 1982 EOPP, Dolfin (2006) reports that about 12 percent of the firms have a great deal of paperwork involved in firing an employee. Firing costs may include not only administrative and legal charges but also other costs such as efficiency losses due to the disruption of the regular flow of work. Moreover, the 2004 World Bank Doing Business survey, which takes into account the cost of advanced notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when firing workers, finds that firing costs in the U.S. are equivalent to 8 weeks of weekly wages of an incumbent employee.
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that, given the magnitude of training and separation costs, hiring decisions should depend crucially not only on the cost of searching for new workers but also on what we call PMLTC.
The model
This economy consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers and a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived firms. Workers and firms discount future payoffs at a common rate δ and capital markets are perfect. In addition, time is discrete.
Workers can be either unemployed or employed. Unemployed workers get b units of the consumption good each period, which could be understood as the value of leisure, home production, or unemployment benefits. Those who are employed can be either entrants (e) or incumbent (i) employees, and earn a wage w e t and w i t , respectively. We assume that entrants receive training and are less productive than incumbent workers. Unemployed workers are first considered entrants once they find a job. At the beginning of each period, entrants become fully productive with probability ι.
There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching unemployed workers and job vacancies. As in den Haan et al. (2000) , we assume that the matching function takes the following form A t , a match-specific term z t , and the worker's type. In particular, a job filled with an incumbent produces A t z t whereas with an entrant it produces A t z t (1 − ξ), with ξ ∈ (0, 1).
The parameter ξ represents both training costs and the "average" productivity gap between entrants and incumbents. The match-specific productivity term z t is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across firms and time, with a cumulative distribution function G(z) and support [0,z] . We also assume that log A t follows a Markovian stochastic process.
Firms may endogenously terminate employment relationships, for which they may incur a cost. In particular, firms lose γ when a match with an incumbent worker is destroyed by the firm. This cost is assumed to be fully wasted and not a transfer, reflecting firing restrictions imposed by the government. In contrast, we assume that laying off entrant workers is costless. One way to justify this assumption is that firms can avoid dismissal protections during the on-the-job training or screening process of new workers.
There are also exogenous separations with probability φ and no firing costs.
In order to describe the firms' behavior, let us define the Bellman equations characterizing the value of vacancies, V t , and filled positions, J e t (z t ) and
where z j t+1 , j = {e, c, i}, are match-specific productivity thresholds defined such that nonprofitable matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed.
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These thresholds (also called reservation productivities) must satisfy the following conditions:
Expressions (5) and (7) define the reservation productivity for entrant and incumbent workers, respectively, whereas condition (6) refers to those entrants on the verge of becoming incumbents. That is, those who become fully productive with probability ι.
Notice that firms have the option to avoid entrant-to-incumbent conversion by laying off workers before legal restrictions become operational. In this case the firm does not have to pay γ if it chooses to break up the match.
It follows that the incumbent and entrant workers separate with probabilities
Moreover, job creation takes place with probability q(θ t )(1 − G( z e t+1 )) when a firm and a worker meet and agree on a contract. Similarly, unemployed workers find a job with
On the workers' side the values of the different statuses -unemployed, U t ; entrant employee, W e t (z t ); and incumbent employee, W i t (z t ) -are given by the following expressions:
To close the model, we need first to incorporate two more assumptions. One is the free entry condition for vacancies: firms will open vacancies until the expected value of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium we must have
The other assumption is that wages are set through Nash bargaining. The Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the worker's and firm's net return from the job match. The first-order conditions for entrants and incumbent employees yield the following two conditions,
(
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes workers bargaining power relative to firms. Notice that the Nash condition for incumbents (15) has an extra term γ. The interpretation is that the firm's threat point when negotiating with an incumbent employee is no longer the value of a vacancy V t but (V t − γ) because now separation costs are relevant.
Using (2)- (15), we can now solve for the equilibrium wages as a function of the current
Introducing PMLTC decreases entrants' wages (16) by a fraction of both the training costs and the separation costs. In contrast, the incumbent wage (17) is higher because incumbents are fully productive workers and separation costs are now operational, which increase their "implicit" bargaining power.
To fully characterize the dynamics of the model economy, we need to define the law of motion for the unemployment rate u t , and the mass of entrant and incumbent workers, n e t and n i t , respectively. These evolve according to the following difference equations:
Finally, the average separation probability is equal to
Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency in order to match several empirical facts of the U.S. economy between 1953 and 2003 . Following Blanchard and Diamond (1990 , we target an average unemployment rate u * of 11%. This value is consistent with the fraction of unmatched workers in the U.S. when we consider not only the officially unemployed but also those not in the labor force who want a job.
We match a steady-state job separation probability s * equal to 0.10 per quarter, which is widely used in the literature and consistent with empirical estimates.
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Our calibration also targets an elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment in the steady state ε * m,u = 0.72 as in Shimer (2005) .
Following Costain and Reiter (2008) , we do not want the unemployment rate to be counterfactually responsive to unemployment benefits. Therefore, we target the semielasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to unemployment benefits equal to 2, which represents the benchmark calibrated value used by them.
We set the discount factor δ = 0.99, which implies a reasonable quarterly interest rate of nearly 1 percent.
We normalize the average aggregate labor productivity A * to 1. We assume that log A t follows a first-order autoregressive process of the form We now turn to the labor turnover cost parameters c, ι, ξ, and γ. As mentioned in Section 2, the 1982 EOPP and the 1992 SBA surveys estimate total hiring costs to be about 4.3 percent of the quarterly compensation of a new hired worker. Therefore, we set c such that in the steady state it is equal to 0.043w
Barron, Berger and Black (1997) document the average time that a newly hired worker takes to become fully trained according to two surveys: the above mentioned 1982 EOPP survey and the 1992 Small Business Administration (SBA) survey. They find that it takes on average between 20.2 and 22.2 weeks to become fully trained.
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The 1992 SBA survey also suggests that the most intense training period is the first three months on the job.
They estimate that around 70 percent of training spells are finished within this period.
However, a new employee needs more than on-the-job training to fill the productivity gap; learning by doing is also part of the training process. As shown in Table 1, Bishop (1996) reports an increase of 34 percent in the productivity of a newly hired worker during the first three months, coinciding with the most intense on-the-job training period, and another 32 percent between the first quarter and the end of the second year, which we consider to be mostly due to learning by doing. In the absence of additional information, we assume that a new entrant takes on average 1 year to become fully productive. Hence, new hired workers become fully productive with probability ι = 0.25.
The parameter ξ can be thought of as consisting of two main components: the actual productivity gap between entrant and incumbent workers, and the cost of training. We denote the average productivity gap during the training process as ψ. We consider training costs as forgone production while training takes place. It consist of both the time devoted Section 2 argues that the initial productivity gap between a new entrant and an incumbent worker is around 40 percent of the latter's productivity. If we assume for simplicity that this initial gap is filled at a constant rate each quarter, the average productivity gap during the training process is about 20 percent. Thus, we set ψ = 0.20 as the average productivity gap between entrants and incumbents during training. Barron, Berger and Black (1997) report an average time spent on on-the-job training for new hires of about 142 hours during the first three months on the job. Notice that this figure is a truncated estimate of the average total hours of training. Indeed, about e we assume that these 142 hours of on-the-job training are evenly distributed across the whole training process, which lasts for 1 year on average. Thus, τ e = 142/(480 × 4) = 0.074.
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We subtract hours of watching others (54.5) from total hours of training to calculate τ i because we assume that those hours do not represent a productivity loss for incumbents.
Thus Table 1 . According to this survey, firing costs in the U.S.
represent 8 weeks of weekly wages of an incumbent employee. Hence, γ = 8/12 = 0.67.
The idiosyncratic productivity z t is assumed to be log-normally distributed with parameters (µ, σ z ). We choose the mean of log z t to be zero. That is, µ = 0. The standard deviation parameter σ z is calibrated together with the hiring cost c, the matching technology parameter ϕ, workers' bargaining power β, and the employment opportunity cost b.
We select these parameters such that the steady-state equilibrium satisfies our cali- 
Simulation
We now simulate both the basic DMP model and our extended version, and turn to a discussion of their business cycle statistics. Notice that for the simulation of the basic model (without PMLTC), we set ξ = γ = 0, and adjust the parameters b, β, c, σ and ϕ in order to maintain our calibration target values.
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In this case, we set b = 0.60, β = 0.837, c = 0.0565, σ z = 0.47 and ϕ = 1.891.
We simulate the model presented above 10,000 times. Each time we simulate the economy for 1,212 "quarters" and throw away the first 1,000 of them in order to obtain the U.S. post Second World War period (212 quarters between 1951-2003) . We detrend the generated data using an HP filter with 10 5 smoothing parameter and, finally, we calculate the standard deviations, autocorrelation coefficients and correlation matrix. In turn, vacancies become more persistent with PMLTC. The autocorrelation coeffi-cient is 0.738 compared to 0.123 in the standard model and 0.940 in the data. Similarly, the negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment is considerably increased from -0.377 to -0.808, which comes much closer to the observed correlation of -0.894 in the U.S. Finally, the standard deviation of the job destruction rate s is the nearly the same in both models and 60 percent smaller than the value observed in the data (0.075).
Results

Discussion
To understand why the cyclical fluctuations of vacancies and unemployment increase when we introduce PMLTC into the model we need to consider the total match surplus of a new entrant. Let us define the new entrant's match surplus as S
After some substitutions we obtain the following expression:
where with and without PMLTC. On impact, the average surplus increases by more than two times in the former case relative to the latter, magnifying the initial response of labor market variables.
According to Costain and Reiter (2008) , the standard matching model with exogenous job destruction can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to unemployment benefits, but it cannot do both. As stressed by these authors, this result depends crucially on the surplus of a match. The smaller this surplus is, the higher the response of the job-finding probability f (θ) to changes in UB. Given the job destruction probability, unemployment becomes more sensitive.
This puzzle is still present with endogenous job destruction because higher levels of UB not only increase unemployment through reductions in f (θ) but also through increments in s. However, our extended model with PMLTC leads to a greater amplification of productivity shocks without introducing "unrealistic" sensitivity to policy changes. The origin of this result lies in the lower response of the job destruction probability to an increase in UB.
This point can be verified in Table 6 . On the one hand, S e is about 50 percent lower when the model accounts for PMLTC than in the case when these costs are omitted. As a result, the elasticity of f (θ) with respect to the employment opportunity cost b in the steady state, ε * f,b , is about two times higher (in absolute value) in the former case (-1.1 with respect to -0.5 when PMLTC are excluded). On the other hand, the elasticity of job destruction probability with respect to b, ε * s,b , is more than 3 times higher when there are no training and separation costs in the model (2.1 with PMLTC versus 0.6). Intuitively, when firing a worker becomes more costly, firms choose to keep relatively more employees in response to an increase in b. Thus, the elasticity of unemployment with respect to b changes only slightly from 2.2 to 1.8.
It is well known that endogenous job destruction tends to induce positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies in the DMP model. For example, Shimer (2005) shows a correlation coefficient of 0.95 between these two variables when there are only stochastic shocks to the job destruction rate. He also shows that the model with labor productivity shocks and a constant job destruction rate is quantitatively consistent with the observed correlation coefficient in the data (-0.894). Costain and Reiter (2008) show similar results. Our simulated results show that our extended model is also quantitatively consistent with the observed downward-sloping Beveridge curve (the simulated correlation coefficient is -0.809). As before, this result takes place because training and separation costs make job creation much more sensitive than job destruction. Hence, employment dynamics is mostly driven by the former. To understand why this induces a more negative correlation, let us think about the opposite case where separations play a bigger role in employment fluctuations. In that case, when a positive productivity shock hits the economy, firms lay off fewer workers which reduces unemployment but dampens vacancy creation because firms do not need to recruit as many workers now.
Finally, notice that in our extended version of the model the correlation coefficient between the average wage and labor productivity remains almost as high as in the basic model because there is no change in the Nash Bargaining scheme. Therefore, we can argue that without introducing wage rigidities it is possible to improve the performance of the model.
Endogenous job destruction and the amplification mechanism
To study how endogenous separations affect vacancies and unemployment fluctuations, we now reduce to a minimun the response of job destruction to aggregate productivity shocks by making all separations exogenous in the steady state. Thus, we set the exogenous separation probability φ to 0.10. This does not necessarily mean that all separations will be exogenous. Out of the steady state, particularly for low levels of aggregate productivity, there could still be endogenous separations.
We also recalibrate parameters b, β, c, σ and ψ in order to maintain our calibration target values. In this case, we set b = 0.776, β = 0.564, c = 0.0424, σ = 0.071 and ψ = 1.551. The simulation results are shown in Table 7 .
Compared with our baseline simulation results in Table 5 , the volatility of vacancies nearly doubles (from 0.062 to 0.115). In contrast, the standard deviation of unemployment is reduced by 28% (from 0.049 to 0.036). As a result, the volatility of labor market tightness increases from 0.105 to 0.146. Thus, a higher response of endogenous job destruction to aggregate shocks significantly dampens the response of vacancies and labor market tightness.
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In this study we argue that introducing post-match labor turnover costs in the standard DMP matching model with endogenous job destruction helps increase the labor market volatility in response to labor productivity shocks of reasonable magnitude.
In particular, the simulation of our model shows that with reasonable parameter values for training and separation costs the volatility of vacancies and labor market tightness more than doubles with respect to the model with no PMLTC. Moreover, in contrast to the standard matching model with endogenous job destruction, our extended model comes close to matching the observed negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment because job creation becomes relatively more sensitive to aggregate productivity shocks than job destruction.
The crucial reason behind this result is the lower value of a new match since (i ) entrants need training before being fully productive as incumbent employees, and (ii) firms may become liable to separation costs in the future. This amplifies the volatility of the model because productivity shocks account for a larger fraction of the value of a newly filled position. Therefore, firms' reaction, namely job creation, is more volatile.
Thus, both vacancies and labor market tightness fluctuate more over the business cycle.
Finally, considering Costain and Reiter's (2008) observation, our matching model generates not only larger cyclical fluctuations in labor market variables but also a sufficiently small response of unemployment to changes in unemployment benefits. This result is driven by how PMLTC affect the elasticity of both the job finding probability and the separation probability with respect to the employment opportunity cost. On the one hand, the elasticity of the former increases with training and separation costs as the sur-plus of a new match falls. On the other hand, higher PMLTC make job destruction less sensitive to policy changes. These two opposing forces counterbalance each other with respect to their impact on the unemployment rate. See Barron, Berger and Black (1997 Increase in productivity of a newly hired worker (%)
Source: Bishop (1996) (15)Between first 2 weeks and next 10 weeks 34.3
(16)Between first 3 months and the end of the 2 year 32.0
Separation costs
Source: Dolfin (2006 ), World Bank (2004 (17)Costly firing documentation (% of firms) 12
(18)Weeks of wages 8 Barron et al. (1997 ), Bishop (1996 , and own assumptions Entrants' conversion probability, ι 0.25 Barron et al. (1997 ), Bishop (1996 , and own assumptions 
